1203.03(a)(i)    "Persons"

Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(a),  protects, inter alia, "persons, living or dead."

Section 45 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §1127, defines "person" and "juristic person" as follows:

The term "person" and any other word or term used to designate the applicant or other entitled to a benefit or privilege or rendered liable under the provisions of this Act includes a juristic person as well as a natural person. The term "juristic person" includes a firm, corporation, union, association, or other organization capable of suing and being sued in a court of law.

The term "persons" in §2(a) refers to real persons, not fictitious characters. It also encompasses groups of persons. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 122 USPQ2d 1757 (2017). With respect to natural persons, they may be living or dead. However, §2(a) may not be applicable with regard to a deceased person when there is no longer anyone entitled to assert a proprietary right or right of privacy. In re MC MC S.r.l., 88 USPQ2d 1378 (TTAB 2008) (holding MARIA CALLAS not to falsely suggest a connection with deceased opera singer Maria Callas); Lucien Piccard Watch Corp. v. Since 1868 Crescent Corp., 314 F. Supp. 329, 165 USPQ 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding DA VINCI not to falsely suggest a connection with deceased artist Leonardo Da Vinci). See TMEP §1203.03(b)(i) regarding elements of a §2(a) false suggestion of a connection refusal.

In the case of a mark comprising the name of a deceased natural person, the "right to the use of a designation which points uniquely to his or her persona may not be protected under Section 2(a) after his or her death unless heirs or other successors are entitled to assert that right." U.S. Olympic Comm. v. Tempting Brands Neth. B.V., 2021 USPQ2d 164, at *20 (TTAB 2021) (quoting In re MC MC S.r.l., 88 USPQ2d at 1380). A key consideration is "whether or not there is someone (this may be a natural person, estate, or juristic entity) with rights in the name." In re MC MC S.r.l., 88 USPQ2d at 1380. Any doubt regarding the existence of heirs or successors with such rights must be resolved in favor of the applicant. See id., at 1381.

In addition to natural persons, §2(a) includes juristic persons, that is, legally created entities such as firms, corporations, unions, associations, or any other organizations capable of suing and being sued in a court of law. See Morehouse Mfg. Corp. v. J. Strickland & Co., 407 F.2d 881, 160 USPQ 715 (C.C.P.A. 1969); Popular Merch. Co. v. "21" Club, Inc., 343 F.2d 1011, 145 USPQ 203 (C.C.P.A. 1965); John Walker & Sons, Ltd. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 110 USPQ 249 (Comm’r Pats. 1956); Copacabana, Inc. v. Breslauer, 101 USPQ 467 (Comm’r Pats. 1954). Juristic persons do not have to be well known to be protected from the registration of a mark that falsely suggests a connection with them. See generally Gavel Club v. Toastmasters Int’l,127 USPQ 88, 94 (TTAB 1960) (noting that §2(a) protection is not limited to large, well known, or nationally recognized institutions). However, there must be a legal successor to assert the rights of a defunct juristic person or otherwise those rights are extinguished when the juristic person becomes bankrupt or ceases to exist without an assignment of interest to another. Pierce-Arrow Soc’y, 2019 USPQ2d 471774, at *6-7 (TTAB 2019) (following In re Wielinski, 49 USPQ2d 1754, 1758 (TTAB 1998), overruled on other grounds, In re WNBA Enters., LLC, 70 USPQ2d 1153 (TTAB 2003)).

Section 45 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §1127,  also defines "person" to include the United States and its agencies and instrumentalities, as well as any state:

The term "person" also includes the United States, any agency or instrumentality thereof, or any individual, firm, or corporation acting for the United States and with the authorization and consent of the United States. The United States, any agency or instrumentality thereof, and any individual, firm, or corporation acting for the United States and with the authorization and consent of the United States, shall be subject to the provisions of this Act in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.

The term "person" also includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this Act in the same manner and to the same extent as any non-governmental entity.

It is well settled that the U.S. government is a "person" within the meaning of §2(a). 15 U.S.C.  §1127; FBI v. Societe: "M.Bril & Co.", 172 USPQ 310, 313 (TTAB 1971). Therefore, the common names of, and acronyms for, U.S. government agencies and instrumentalities are considered persons. See In re Peter S. Herrick P.A., 91 USPQ2d 1505, 1506-08 (TTAB 2009) (stating the statutory definition of "person" includes the United States and any agency or instrumentality thereof and concluding that "[t]he only entity the name ‘U.S. Customs Service’ could possibly identify is the government agency" formerly known as the U.S. Customs Service and now known as U.S. Customs and Border Protection); NASA v. Record Chem. Co., 185 USPQ 563, 566 (TTAB 1975) (finding the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is a juristic person); FBI, 172 USPQ at 313 (noting the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is a juristic person).