1203.03(b)    False Suggestion of a Connection

Section 2(a) prohibits the registration of a mark that consists of or comprises matter that may falsely suggest a connection with persons, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols. See TMEP §1203.03(a)(i) regarding persons, TMEP §1203.03(a)(ii) regarding institutions, TMEP §1203.03(a)(iii) regarding national symbols, and TMEP §1203.03 for information about the legislative history of §2(a).

1203.03(b)(i)    Elements of a §2(a) False Suggestion of a Connection Refusal

To establish that a proposed mark falsely suggests a connection with a person or an institution, it must be shown that:

  • (1) the mark is the same as, or a close approximation of, the name or identity previously used by another person or institution;
  • (2) the mark would be recognized as such, in that it points uniquely and unmistakably to that person or institution;
  • (3) the person or institution named by the mark is not connected with the activities performed by the applicant under the mark; and
  • (4) the fame or reputation of the person or institution is such that, when the mark is used with the applicant’s goods or services, a connection with the person or institution would be presumed.

Piano Factory Grp., Inc. v. Schiedmayer Celesta GmbH, 11 F.4th 1363, 1377, 2021 USPQ2d 913, at *11 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citing In re Jackson, 103 USPQ2d 1417, 1419 (TTAB 2012)); U.S. Olympic Comm. v. Tempting Brands Neth. B.V., 2021 USPQ2d 164, at *17-18 (TTAB 2021) (citing Pierce-Arrow Soc’y v. Spintek Filtration, Inc., 2019 USPQ2d 471774, at *4 (TTAB 2019)); see In re ADCO Indus. – Techs., L.P., 2020 USPQ2d 53786, at *3 (TTAB 2020); In re Pedersen, 109 USPQ 2d 1185, 1188-89 (TTAB 2013); In re Jackson Int’l Trading Co. Kurt D. Bruhl GmbH & Co. KG, 103 USPQ2d 1417, 1419 (TTAB 2012); In re Peter S. Herrick, P.A., 91 USPQ2d 1505, 1507 (TTAB 2009); In re MC MC S.r.l., 88 USPQ2d 1378, 1379 (TTAB 2008); Ass’n Pour La Def. et la Promotion de L'Oeuvre de Marc Chagall dite Comite Marc Chagall v. Bondarchuk, 82 USPQ2d 1838, 1842 (TTAB 2007); In re White, 80 USPQ2d 1654, 1658 (TTAB 2006); In re White, 73 USPQ2d 1713, 1718 (TTAB 2004); In re Nuclear Research Corp., 16 USPQ2d 1316, 1317 (TTAB 1990); Buffett v. Chi-Chi’s, Inc., 226 USPQ 428, 429 (TTAB 1985); In re Cotter & Co., 228 USPQ 202, 204 (TTAB 1985); see also Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imps. Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1375-77, 217 USPQ 505, 508-10 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (providing foundational principles for the four-part test used to determine false connection).

First element. The term at issue need not be the actual, legal name of the party falsely associated with the applicant’s mark. See, e.g., Hornby v. TJX Cos., 87 USPQ2d 1411, 1417, 1424 (TTAB 2008) (finding TWIGGY to be the nickname of professional model Lesley Hornby); Buffett v. Chi Chi’s, Inc., 226 USPQ at 429-30 (finding MARGARITAVILLE to be the public persona of singer Jimmy Buffett). "[A] nickname or an informal reference, even one created by the public, can qualify as an entity's ‘identity,’ thereby giving rise to a protectable interest." Bos. Athletic Ass'n v. Velocity, LLC, 117 USPQ2d 1492, 1496 (TTAB 2015). A term may also be considered the identity of a person "even if the person has not used that term." In re ADCO Indus. – Techs., L.P., 2020 USPQ2d 53786, at *4 (citing In re Nieves & Nieves LLC, 113 USPQ2d 1629, 1644 (TTAB 2015); In re Urbano, 51 USPQ2d 1776, 1779 (TTAB 1999)). In addition, the fact that a term identifies both a particular group of people and the language spoken by some of the members of the group is not evidence that it fails to identify the group. In re Pedersen, 109 USPQ 2d at 1190 (rejecting applicant’s argument that, because the term LAKOTA identifies a language, it does not approximate the name or identity of a people or institution).

Second element. The requirement that the proposed mark would be recognized as pointing uniquely and unmistakably to the person or institution does not mean that the term itself must be unique. In re Jackson Int’l Trading Co. Kurt D. Bruhl GmbH & Co. KG, 103 USPQ2d at 1419, 1420; Hornby, 87 USPQ2d at 1426. Rather, the question is whether, as used with the goods or services in question, consumers would view the mark as pointing uniquely to the person or institution, or whether they would perceive it to have a different meaning. E.g., Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac, 703 F.2d at 1377, 217 USPQ at 509 (finding NOTRE DAME did not point uniquely and unmistakably to the appellant, the University of Notre Dame in Indiana, because the name identifies a famous religious figure and is used in the names of churches dedicated to this figure such as the Cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris, France); Schiedmayer Celesta GmbH v. Piano Factory Grp., Inc., 2019 USPQ2d 341894, at *7 (TTAB 2019) (quoting In re White, 73 USPQ2d at 1720) (finding SCHIEDMAYER pointed uniquely and unmistakably to petitioner based on evidence that the name had been associated with a family prominent in the keyboard musical instrument industry for hundreds of years and had no other meaning), aff’d, 11 F.4th 1363, 2021 USPQ2d 913 (Fed. Cir. 2021); Hornby, , 87 USPQ2d at 1427 (finding TWIGGY pointed uniquely and unmistakably to petitioner, who was recognized as a famous British model, and that the dictionary meaning of "twiggy" as resembling or abounding in twigs would not be the consumers’ perception of the name for respondent’s children’s clothing).

In addition, unassociated third-party use of a term does not in and of itself establish that that the term does not point uniquely or unmistakably to a particular people or institution. In re Pedersen, 109 USPQ2d at 1196 (finding consumer exposure to third-party use of LAKOTA on products and services unrelated to applicant’s insufficient to show that applicant’s use of LAKOTA does not point uniquely to the Lakota people)); Hornby, 87 USPQ2d at 1427 (finding evidence of third-party registrations showing registration of the term "TWIGGY" for goods unrelated to children’s clothing to have "no probative value").

Third element. A connection with an entity is established when the record establishes a specific endorsement, sponsorship, or the like of the particular goods and services, whether written or implied. In re White, 80 USPQ2d 1654, at 1660-61. In In re Sloppy Joe’s International Inc., 43 USPQ2d 1350, 1353-54 (TTAB 1997) , the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board held that Ernest Hemingway’s friendship with the original owner of applicant’s bar, his frequenting the bar, and his use of the back room as an office did not establish the kind of "connection" that entitled applicant to register a mark consisting in part of a portrait of Hemingway. Rather, a commercial connection, such as an ownership interest or commercial endorsement or sponsorship of applicant’s services would be necessary to entitle the applicant to registration. Id.

If it is unclear whether the person or institution is connected with the goods sold or services performed by the applicant, the examining attorney must make an explicit inquiry under 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b). If the examining attorney independently confirms that the person or institution is connected with the goods sold or services performed by the applicant, a Note to the File must be entered in the record to reflect that no further action is required as to the issue of false suggestion of a connection. See TMEP §710.02.

Fourth element. To establish the fame or reputation of the person or institution under this factor, one is not required to show the fame or reputation of the name "in the entire United States." Ass’n Pour la Defense et la Promotion de L'Oeuvre de Marc Chagall Dite Comite Marc Chagall v. Bondarchuk, 82 USPQ2d at 1843, 1844 (finding the evidence sufficiently showed the fame and reputation of Russian artist Marc Chagall where his work had been featured in exhibits in several major U.S. cities in several regions as well as in permanent public displays, including large stained glass windows installed at the United Nations).

Further, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stated

[A] party's name may be famous among the particular consumers of those goods and services even if it is not famous among members of the general public. And a party's name may be associated with particular goods such that a false association may be established with goods or services of that type even if it would not have been established with respect to entirely different goods or services.

Piano Factory Grp., Inc., 11 F.4th at 1380, 2021 USPQ2d 913, at *14-15 (citing In re Nieves & Nieves, LLC, 113 USPQ2d at 1633; In re Pedersen, 109 USPQ2d at 1202; U.S. Navy v. U.S. Mfg. Co., 2 USPQ2d 1254, 1260 (TTAB 1987); 7 Louis Altman & Mall Pollack, Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks & Monopolies §26.21, at 26-103-04 (4th ed. 2021)).

Intent. Intent to identify a party or trade on its goodwill is not a required element of a §2(a) claim of false suggestion of an association with such party. S & L Acquisition Co. v. Helene Arpels, Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1221, 1224 (TTAB 1987) ; Consol. Natural Gas Co. v. CNG Fuel Sys., Ltd., 228 USPQ 752, 754 (TTAB 1985) . However, evidence of such an intent could be highly persuasive that the public would make the intended false association. Piano Factory Grp. Inc., 11 F.4th at 1380-81, 2021 USPQ2d 913, at *15 (citing Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac, 703 F.2d at 1377, 217 USPQ at 509; In re Pedersen, 109 USPQ2d at 1202; In re Peter S. Herrick, P.A., 91 USPQ2d at 1509; Ass’n Pour la Defense et la Promotion de L'Oeuvre de Marc Chagall Dite Comite Marc Chagall, 82 USPQ2d at 1843).

Prior user. A refusal on this basis requires, by implication, that the person or institution with which a connection is falsely suggested must be the prior user. In re Nuclear Rsch. Corp., 16 USPQ2d at 1317 (citing In re Mohawk Air Servs., Inc., 196 USPQ 851, 854-55 (TTAB 1977)); see In re Wielinski, 49 USPQ2d 1754, 1758 (TTAB 1998) (citing In re Kayser-Roth Corp., 29 USPQ2d 1379, 1384-85 (TTAB 1993); Kardex Sys., Inc. v. Sistemco N.V., 221 USPQ2d 149, 151 (TTAB 1983)). However, it is not necessary that the prior user ever commercially exploit the name as a trademark or in a manner analogous to trademark use. In re Pedersen, 109 USPQ2d at 1193; see In re ADCO Indus. – Techs., L.P., 2020 USPQ2d 53786, at *4. A false suggestion of a connection may be found when the party’s right to control the use of its identity is violated, even if there is no juristic entity having the authority to authorize use of the mark. In re Pedersen, 109 USPQ2d at 1193.

1203.03(b)(ii)    Government Agencies and Instrumentalities

Registration of matter that may falsely suggest a connection with a United States government agency or instrumentality is prohibited under §2(a). See TMEP §1203.03(b)(i) (setting out the four-element test). Some names, acronyms, titles, terms, and symbols of United States government agencies or instrumentalities are also protected by separate statute. See TMEP §1205.01 for information about statutorily protected matter and Appendix C  for a nonexhaustive list of United States statutes protecting designations of certain government agencies and instrumentalities. Many of these statutes allow third parties to use the protected matter when authorized by an agency official. This authorization to use, by itself, should not be construed to extend to authorization to register marks that include matter the applicant does not own. See generally TMEP §1201 regarding the ownership requirement. Where it appears from the record that the applicant is not the agency or instrumentality referenced in the mark, but the record suggests an affiliation between the applicant and the referenced agency, the examining attorney must require the applicant to establish its authorization to register the mark by requesting information pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b). See TMEP §1201.06(c).

Registration must be refused if the nature of the mark and the nature of the goods or services is such that a United States government agency or instrumentality would be presumed to be the source or sponsorship of the applicant’s goods or services. In re Peter S. Herrick, P.A., 91 USPQ2d 1505, 1507-08 (TTAB 2009) (finding "U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE" is a close approximation of the former name of the government agency, United States Customs Service, which is now known as the United States Customs and Border Protection but which is still referred to as the U.S. Customs Service by the public and the agency itself, that the seal design in the proposed mark is nearly identical to the seal used by the former United Stated Customs Service, that the only meaning the "U.S. Customs Service" has is to identify the government agency, and that a connection between applicant’s attorney services and the activities performed by the United States Customs and Border Protection would be presumed); In re Nat'l Intelligence Acad., 190 USPQ 570, 572 (TTAB 1976) (stating NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACADEMY, for educational and instructional services in intelligence gathering for law enforcement officers, falsely suggests a connection with the United States government since intelligence gathering is a known function of a number of government agencies and "[a] normal outgrowth and development of such activities would be the training of officers in intelligence gathering"); In re Teasdale Packing Co., 137 USPQ 482 (TTAB 1963) (holding U. S. AQUA and design unregistrable under §2(a) on the ground that purchasers of applicant’s canned drinking water would be misled into assuming approval or sponsorship by the United States government in view of the nature of the mark, including a red, white, and blue shield design, and the nature of the goods, the Board noting a program for stocking emergency supplies of water in fallout shelters and the setting of standards for drinking water by United States government agencies).

The record must include evidence showing that the designation in the mark references the agency or instrumentality and that the goods or services are such that a connection with that agency or instrumentality would be presumed, particularly when it is not readily apparent that the wording or acronym in the mark refers to the agency or instrumentality. Compare In re Mohawk Air Serv. Inc., 196 USPQ 851, 855 (TTAB 1977) (holding MOHAWK 298, for airplanes, to not falsely suggest a connection with the U.S. Army and the Army’s use of the term "Mohawk" to identify one of its airplanes, since there was no evidence of record that the Army continuously used the term since 1958, that the public was aware of such use, or that the public would associate "Mohawk" named airplanes with the U.S. Army), with In re U.S. Bicentennial Soc’y, 197 USPQ 905, 906-07 (TTAB 1978) (holding U.S. BICENTENNIAL SOCIETY, for ceremonial swords, to falsely suggest a connection with the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission and the United States government, based on applicant’s claims in the specimen of record and the fact that "swords have historically been presented by grateful sovereigns and governments to persons who have been honored by such gifts and that ceremonial swords are on display in the museum at Mt. Vernon").

Furthermore, the question of the registrability of a mark under §2(a) "is determined in each case by the nature of the goods or services in connection with which the mark is used and the impact of such use on the purchasers of goods or services of this type." NASA v. Record Chemical Co. Inc., 185 USPQ 563, 568 (TTAB 1975) . Thus, the identified goods or services must be scrutinized in the context of the current marketplace to determine whether they are of the type to be offered by United States government agencies and instrumentalities. For instance, if the evidence supports a finding that it is commonplace for government agencies to sell or license the sale of consumer merchandise featuring agency names or acronyms, such as clothing, toys, key chains, and calendars, a false connection with a government agency would be presumed if that agency name or acronym is used in connection with those goods and, therefore, the mark should be refused registration under §2(a).

The §2(a) false suggestion of a connection refusal and the procedures stated above also apply to marks containing names of, and acronyms and terms for, United States government programs (e.g., Medicare or FAFSA), military projects (e.g., BigDog), and quasi-government organizations (e.g., Smithsonian Institution). The examining attorney may also require the applicant to provide additional information about the mark and/or the goods or services, under Trademark Rule 2.61(b). 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b).

Disclaiming the name of, or acronym for, the United States government agency or instrumentality to which the mark refers generally will not overcome the §2(a) refusal. See TMEP §1213.03(a) regarding unregistrable components of marks. If the test for false suggestion of a connection under §2(a) is not met, the examining attorney must still determine whether the applicant is authorized to register the designation in the mark. If, based on the record, the applicant lacks authorization from the government agency or instrumentality to register the mark, the examining attorney must refuse under §§1 and 45 of the Trademark Act. See TMEP §1201.06(c).

1203.03(b)(iii)    False Suggestion of a Connection: Case References

Some designations have been held to falsely suggest a connection to a person or an institution within the meaning of §2(a). E.g., Piano Factory Grp., Inc. v. Schiedmayer Celesta GmbH, ___ F.4th ___, 2021 USPQ2d 913, at 15-16 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (holding SCHIEDMAYER for pianos falsely suggests a conection with the well-known Schiedmayer Celesta GmbH business that has manufactured and sold quality keyboard musical instruments for nearly 300 years); In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 571 F.3d 1171, 91 USPQ2d 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding SHINNECOCK BRAND FULL FLAVOR and SHINNECOCK BRAND LIGHTS, both for cigarettes, falsely suggest a connection with the Shinnecock Indian Nation); In re ADCO Indus. – Techs., L.P., 2020 USPQ2d 53786 (TTAB 2020) (holding TRUMP-IT MY PACKAGE OPENER MAKE OPENING PACKAGES GREAT and design and TRUMP-IT MY PACKAGE OPENER and design, both for utility knives, falsely suggest a connection with Donald Trump); In re Jackson Int’l Trading Co. Kurt D. Bruhl GmbH & Co. KG, 103 USPQ2d 1417 (TTAB 2012) (holding BENNY GOODMAN COLLECTION THE FINEST QUALITY (stylized) for fragrance and cosmetics falsely suggests a connection with the deceased musician Benny Goodman; the record showed that Benny Goodman’s estate had a business representative that granted people the use of his name and/or persona); In re Peter S. Herrick, P.A., 91 USPQ2d 1505 (TTAB 2009) (holding U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE and seal design for attorney services falsely suggests a connection with the government agency formerly known as the U.S. Customs Service and now known as the U.S. Customs and Border Protection); Hornby v. TJX Cos., 87 USPQ2d 1411 (TTAB 2008) (holding TWIGGY for children’s clothing falsely suggests a connection with the internationally known British model and actress who was a major celebrity in the late 1960s, finding that she retained a sufficient degree of fame or reputation that a connection would still be presumed by consumers seeing the mark TWIGGY on children’s clothing as of the date on which respondent’s registration issued in 2000); Ass'n Pour La Def. et la Promotion de L'Oeuvre de Marc Chagall dite Comite Marc Chagall v. Bondarchuk, 82 USPQ2d 1838 (TTAB 2007) (holdinig MARC CHAGALL for vodka falsely suggests a connection with the painter Marc Chagall); In re White, 80 USPQ2d 1654 (TTAB 2006) (holding MOHAWK for cigarettes falsely suggests a connection with the federally recognized tribe the St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians of New York); In re White, 73 USPQ2d 1713 (TTAB 2004) (holding APACHE for cigarettes falsely suggests a connection with the nine federally recognized Apache tribes); In re Urbano, 51 USPQ2d 1776 (TTAB 1999) (holding SYDNEY 2000, used for advertising and business services and communication services, falsely suggests a connection with Olympic Games, since the general public would recognize phrase as referring unambiguously to Olympic Games to be held in Sydney, Australia in 2000; entire organization that comprises Olympic games qualifies as "institution."); In re N. Am. Free Trade Ass’n, 43 USPQ2d 1282 (TTAB 1997) (holding NAFTA, used on "promotion of trade and investment" services, falsely suggests a connection with the North American Free Trade Agreement; NAFTA qualifies as institution because it encompasses treaty, supplemental agreements, and various commissions, committees and offices created by those documents); In re Sloppy Joe’s Int’l Inc., 43 USPQ2d 1350 (TTAB 1997) (holding SLOPPY JOE’S, with design that includes portrait of Ernest Hemingway falsely suggests a connection with deceased writer); In re Sauer, 27 USPQ2d 1073 (TTAB 1993) holding BO BALL for oblong shaped leather ball with white stitching falsely suggests a connection with athlete Bo Jackson, aff’d per curiam, 26 F.3d 140 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Alabama v. BAMA-Werke Curt Baumann, 231 USPQ 408 (TTAB 1986) (granting petition to cancel registration of BAMA, for shoes, slippers, stockings because BAMA pointed uniquely to the University of Alabama and thus falsely suggests a connection with the University); In re Cotter & Co., 228 USPQ 202 (TTAB 1985) (holding WESTPOINT, for shotguns and rifles, falsely suggests a connection with an institution, the U.S. Military Academy); Buffett v. Chi-Chi’s, Inc., 226 USPQ 428 (TTAB 1985) (denying applicant’s motion for summary judgment since evidence of record supported an association of MARGARITAVILLE with the public persona of opposer Jimmy Buffett); In re U.S. Bicentennial Soc'y, 197 USPQ 905 (TTAB 1978) (holding U.S. BICENTENNIAL SOCIETY, for ceremonial swords, falsely suggests a connection with the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission and the U.S. government); In re Nat'l Intelligence Acad., 190 USPQ 570 (TTAB 1976) (holding NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACADEMY, for educational and instructional services in intelligence gathering for law enforcement officers, falsely suggests a connection with the U.S. government); In re Nat’l Collection & Credit Control, 152 USPQ 200 (TTAB 1966) (holding the word "national" along with an outline representation of the United States or a representation of an eagle, for collection and credit services, falsely suggests a connection with the U.S. government).

Other designations have been held not to falsely suggest a connection to a person or institution within the meaning of §2(a). E.g., Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imps. Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1377, 217 USPQ 505, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding NOTRE DAME and design, for cheese, not to falsely suggest a connection with the University of Notre Dame. "As the Board noted, ‘Notre Dame’ is not a name solely associated with the University. It serves to identify a famous and sacred religious figure and is used in the names of churches dedicated to Notre Dame, such as the Cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris, France. Thus it cannot be said that the only ‘person’ which the name possibly identifies is the University and that the mere use of NOTRE DAME by another appropriates its identity."), aff’g 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982); U.S. Olympic Comm. v. Tempting Brands Neth. B.V., 2021 USPQ2d 164, at *2-3, 22, 32-33 (TTAB 2021) (holding PIERRE DE COUBERTIN for a variety of personal goods, including toiletries, jewelry, and clothing, not to falsely suggest a connection with opposer the U.S. Olympic Committee because, although Coubertin is widely recognized for launching the Olympic movement in the late 19th century, evidence did not show his name pointing uniquely to the USOC or the Olympic movement); Pierce-Arrow Soc’y v. Spintek Filtration, Inc., 2019 USPQ2d 471774, at *6-8 (TTAB 2019) (holding PIERCE-ARROW for automobilies not to falsely suggest a connection with the Pierce-Arrow Society because the evidence did not show the society was a legal successor of the Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Company, the sociey’s preservation efforts of the car made by and protection of the marks of that company did not uniquely point to the society, and the former company and its abandoned trademarks were not famous or had any reputation that transferred to the society); Bos. Athletic Ass'n v. Velocity, LLC, 117 USPQ2d 1492, 1496-99 (TTAB 2016) (oholding MARATHON MONDAY for clothing not to falsely suggest a connection with opposer because the evidence did not establish that MARATHON MONDAY is perceived by the relevant public as a close approximation of the name or identity of opposer, and frequent and various third-party uses of MARATHON MONDAY indicated that the term does not point uniquely and unmistakably to opposer); In re MC MC S.r.l.,88 USPQ2d 1378, 1381 (TTAB 2008) holding MARIA CALLAS for jewelry and other goods not to falsely suggest a connection with Maria Callas, the famous deceased opera singer, her heirs or her estate because the record contained contradictory evidence as to the existence of anyone currently possessing rights in the name "Maria Callas," and resolving doubt in favor of applicant "removes the possibility that we might be denying registration to an applicant based on non-existent rights," and because a person or entity claiming rights in a name or persona has recourse since §2(a) is not time barred); In re L.A. Police Revolver & Athletic Club, Inc., 69 USPQ2d 1630 (TTAB 2004) (holding slogan TO PROTECT AND TO SERVE, used by applicant Los Angeles Police Revolver and Athletic Club, Inc., not to falsely suggest a connection with the Los Angeles Police Department, where evidence showed an actual longstanding commercial connection, publicly acknowledged and endorsed by both parties); Internet Inc. v. Corp. for Nat’l Resch. Initiatives, 38 USPQ2d 1435 (TTAB1996) (holding cancellation petitioners failed to state claim for relief where they had not alleged, and could not reasonably allege, that the term INTERNET points uniquely and unmistakably to their own identity or persona); Ritz Hotel Ltd. v. Ritz Closet Seat Corp., 17 USPQ2d 1466, 1471 (TTAB 1990) (holding RIT-Z in stylized form for toilet seats not to falsely suggest a connection with opposer, where there was no evidence showing a connection between applicant’s mark and opposer corporation, The Ritz Hotel Limited); In re Nuclear Rsch. Corp., 16 USPQ2d 1316 (TTAB 1990) (holding NRC and design, for radiation and chemical agent monitors, electronic testers, and nuclear gauges, not to falsely suggest a connection with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in view of applicant’s use of NRC long prior to the inception of that agency); NASA v. Bully Hill Vineyards, Inc., 3 USPQ2d 1671, 1676 (TTAB 1987) (dismissing opposition to the registration of SPACE SHUTTLE for wines and holding "shuttle" to be a generic term for a space vehicle or system; "[w]here a name claimed to be appropriated does not point uniquely and unmistakably to that party’s personality or ‘persona,’ there can be no false suggestion" of connection); In re Mohawk Air Serv. Inc., 196 USPQ 851 (TTAB 1977) (holding MOHAWK 298 not to falsely suggest a connection with the U.S. Army and the Army’s use of the term "Mohawk" to identify one of its airplanes, since there was no evidence that the Army continuously used that term since 1958, the public was aware of such use, or the public would associate "Mohawk" named airplanes with the Army); NASA v. Record Chem. Co., 185 USPQ 563 (TTAB 1975) (dismissing opposition to registrations of APOLLO 8 for moth preventatives and mothproofing agent-air freshener because, while NASA is a juristic person and prior user of the terms APOLLO and APOLLO 8 for its space missions, it is unlikely that the average purchaser of applicant’s goods would assume NASA to be source or sponsorship of the goods or mistakenly believe that the goods were of NASA space exploration technology); FBI v. Societe: "M.Bril & Co.", 172 USPQ 310 (TTAB 1971) (dismissing opposition to registration of FBI FABRICATION BRIL INTERNATIONAL for clothing since it was unreasonable that the public would assume applicant’s goods originated with, were sponsored or endorsed by, or associated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, finding that "FBI" represents "Fabrication Bril International" and purchasers would see the entire composite mark on the goods and not just "FBI," and noting that both the U.S. government and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are juristic persons); In re Horwitt, 125 USPQ 145, 146 (TTAB 1960) (holding U. S. HEALTH CLUB registrable for vitamin tablets. "Considering both the nature of the mark and the goods, it is concluded that the purchasing public would not be likely to mistakenly assume that the United States Government is operating a health club, that it is distributing vitamins, or that it has approved applicant’s goods."); Lucien Piccard Watch Corp. v. Since 1868 Crescent Corp., 314 F. Supp. 329, 165 USPQ 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding DA VINCI not to falsely suggest a connection with deceased artist Leonardo Da Vinci).